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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Resist!”1   
- Duncan Kennedy  
 
I am disappointed in the legal education I have received.2 I entered law school with 
training in Catholic social teaching, liberation theology, creative nonviolence and the Catholic 
Worker Movement.3 In many ways the training was unsettling. My service learning experiences 
exposed me to the human suffering that accompanies systemic forms of subordination and 
discrimination. Reconciling such harsh realities with my own lived experience, as the white son 
of a Mayo Clinic surgeon, is an ongoing struggle. I have not, however, struggled alone. My 
collegiate experiences exposed me to dynamic communities of scholars, activists and friends, all 
committed to fighting for social justice. Similarly to Eamon Joyce’s expectations of law school, I 
hoped to “utilize these tools and theories in the law school context, challenging the Master’s 
voice in many of the languages of the Master.”4 After nearly two years of legal inculcation, many 
of my hopes have been dashed. 
 My hopes have been replaced by a legal academe that pushes discussion of race, class 
and economic inequality to the periphery.5 In my own view, it is the immensity of silence that is 
disconcerting. The fact that I did not formally study critical race theory until well into the second 
year of my legal education is a testament to the institutional hostility to outsider scholarship.6  
 The experience has been demobilizing. I rarely feel intellectually engaged in the 
classroom. I often sit in class bored and leave tired, disillusioned. I think much of my fatigue 
emanates from what Duncan Kennedy has described as the experience of double surrender.7 As 
explained by Kennedy: 
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The actual intellectual content of the law seems to consist of learning the rules, 
what they are and why they have to be the way they are, while rooting for the 
occasional judge who seems willing to make them marginally more humane. The 
basic experience is of double surrender: to a passivizing classroom experience and 
to a passive attitude toward the content of the legal system.8 
I did not resist. I had qualms about the way issues were discussed but I adapted, I 
acquiesced to the system. I read the cases. I learned the nuances of case analysis. I learned the 
rules and how to apply them. I learned the basics of legal reasoning. I got by.  
 If my Property I grade was any indication, I was certainly not the “extraordinary first year 
student who could, on his or her own, develop a theoretically critical attitude toward this 
system.”9 Yet I wanted to. I felt stymied by the decontextualized analyses of cases that led to 
contrived classroom discussions devoid of any political, theoretical or historical meaning. These 
experiences encouraged me to question the system of legal rules and reasoning that everyone was 
simply taught to accept.10 
 Duncan Kennedy has described the implicit messages embodied within the formal legal 
curriculum as “nonsense.”11 This paper is an attempt to draw meaning from this body of 
nonsense. It is a personal attempt to embrace Duncan Kennedy’s call for resistance.12 It is a 
product of my frustrations with a disappointing law school experience.  
 This paper argues that the dominant legal pedagogy, the case-dialogue method, 
perpetuates white privilege through active subordination of minority law students. The paper is 
divided into five sections. Part I explores the history of the case-dialogue method. This section 
begins with a discussion of the case-dialogue’s historical origins and development. Part I 
concludes with a description of the case-dialogue method and a discussion of the pedagogy’s 
early criticisms. Part II exposes the fundamental presumption of the case-dialogue method – the 
objectivity of legal analysis – as false. Part III analyzes the dynamics of white privilege. Whites’ 
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unconsciousness of whiteness, the reality of white privilege and the need to confront racial 
subordination with race consciousness are all discussed. Part IV analyzes how the case-dialogue 
method’s incorrect presumption of objectivity operates as a white perspective. Part IV concludes 
by analyzing how this analytical method subordinates minority law students in the classroom. 
Part V puts forth a number of suggestions for pedagogical change that would confront the 
existence of white privilege in legal education.  
 
II. A HISTORY OF THE CASE-DIALOGUE METHOD 
“Many law professors are conscientious and devoted teachers, and quite a few 
are inspired ones, but their efforts are constrained and hobbled by an educational 
model that treats the entire twentieth century as little more than a passing 
annoyance.” 13 
- Edward Rubin 
 
 The nineteenth century was a period of uncertainty in American legal education.14 There 
was not a uniform approach for teaching the law.15 Many students focused on the scholarly 
aspects of the law and studied philosophy and Roman law in conjunction with their studies of 
substantive American law.16 Other law students forwent a formal classroom education and 
learned the law by apprenticeships.17 The popularity of legal apprenticeships threatened the very 
existence of law schools.18 Universities saw little scholarly value in the study of law because it 
was seen as a craft, not an academic subject.19 The strongest critics believed that law schools 
should be abolished in favor of a straight apprenticeship program.20 
 Christopher Langdell’s appointment to the deanship at Harvard in 1870 ended any 
possibility of law school’s demise as an institution.21 Langdell regarded the law as a science in 
its own right.22 As a science, Langdell perceived the law as a coherent body of rules.23 To find 
the rules, students must consult authoritative sources, such as the Constitution or judicial 
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opinions.24 Langdell believed that “scientific” legal principles could be found by studying these 
authoritative sources.25 Edward Rubin provides a succinct explanation of Langdell’s perspective 
on the law: 
To study the law, according to the curricular innovations that Langdell 
introduced, meant to discern the principles that determined good decisions and 
gave those decisions coherence. To improve the law meant to alter or overrule 
judicial decisions that conflicted with those principles so that the totality of 
decisions formed a conceptually coherent unit. This framework permitted the 
analogy between the study of law and the study of natural science.26 
A scientific inquiry, in Langdell’s view, started and stopped with the analysis of authoritative 
sources such as appellate court decisions.27 The focus on court cases in law school curriculum 
became known as the case-dialogue method.28 
 The formal introduction of Langdell’s case-dialogue method occurred the same year 
Langdell assumed the deanship, 1870.29 Viewing law through the prism of “science” provided 
additional scholarly legitimacy to the subject.30 Concerns over the scholarliness of the law 
dissipated and law schools across the country adopted the case-dialogue method.31 
 Langdell’s broad decision to limit the study of law to case reports had a fair share of 
practical problems.32 Certainly, students could not read all the case reports on a subject.33 
Langdell solved this problem by creating casebooks that included only a select number of legal 
decisions.34 Kara Abramson described Langdell’s casebooks as such: “Not all legal decisions 
were fair game in his pedagogic vision, however. Instead, he selected only a few designed to 
reveal a body of doctrine or illustrate mistaken deviations from the rules.”35 
 Langdell was also confronted with a decision regarding the appropriate role of the law 
professor.36 Langdell believed that an examination of original sources would not be scientific if it 
simply involved rote memorization of facts and rules.37 Langdell decided to abandon traditional 
lecturing and adopt the “Socratic method.”38 Instead of lecturing, professors would ask the 
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students to provide a case’s facts, procedural history, legal issue, and reasoning.39 Students 
discovered the necessary rules and principles of a subject through their Socratic dialogue with 
the professor.40  
  By the early twentieth century, Langdell’s case-dialogue method became the norm in 
American law schools.41 Remarkably, despite over a century of history, Langdell’s case-dialogue 
method continues to be the dominant pedagogical tool in the modern law school classroom.42 
John Sexton discusses the resiliency of Langdell’s pedagogical approach:  
What is surprising is that, in the face of seismic changes in the world of law 
practice, it has taken so long for the conversation [about reforming U.S. legal 
education] to begin – and that our pedagogy has remained unchanged for over 100 
years. True, the last three decades have seen the development of clinical legal 
education and interdisciplinary work; but these pedagogies have matured within 
the traditional framework, with the actual change being at the margins.43 
 As alluded to by John Sexton, there have been challenges to Langdell’s pedagogy.44 In 
the 1920’s, legal realists challenged Langdell’s view of the law as a distinct science.45 Legal 
realists related the law to the social environment in which it originated.46 Realists believed that 
fundamental legal rules and principles meant little if they were not analyzed within a broader 
social context.47 Langdell’s “scientific” inquiry, however, did not move beyond the facts and 
reasoning contained in a court’s opinion.48 Realists believed such reasoning was narrow and 
constrained.49 Despite legal realists’ challenge to Langdell’s approach, law schools continued to 
employ Langell’s methods in their classrooms.50 
 Developments over the last fifty years have also challenged the predominance of 
Langdell’s pedagogy in the law school classroom.51 Schools have adopted more electives and 
courses involving clinical work.52 New pedagogies have been introduced such as the problem 
method and the inclusion of broad introductory legal courses.53 However, as described by Kara 
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Abramson, these changes have represented “more of an ornament atop the dominant Langdellian 
cast of legal education rather than a replacement of it.” 54 
 Every law student who has been asked to recite the material substantive facts of Palsgraf, 
or to explain the court’s reasoning in Erie Railroad, has been touched by Langdell’s legacy. 
Langdell’s case-dialogue method pedagogy continues to stand as the overarching framework for 
teaching law students how to “think like a lawyer.” 
 
III. THE FALSE PRESUMPTION OF THE CASE-DIALOGUE METHOD 
“There is a real danger that inculcation into a legal culture - learning the rules of 
the game - can divert the initiates into a love of legal reasoning for its own sake. 
Seduced by the search for elegance and coherence and obsessed with technique, 
they lose sight of the ends and purposes which the law is intended to serve.”55 
- Michael Cooper 
 
Law students are often told that they are being trained to think like lawyers. Thinking like 
a lawyer is commonly understood as a form of critical thinking used to solve legal problems.56 
The distinction between thinking like a lawyer and other forms of critical thinking lies in the 
lawyer’s ability to spot and define a legal problem and then utilize the relevant facts and legal 
rules necessary to resolve that problem in their client’s favor.57 
The case-dialogue method is adeptly used in the training of law students to think like 
lawyers.58 As discussed previously, it was Langdell’s hope that students would extrapolate 
“scientific” legal principles from the relevant facts provided in a case report.59 In order to deduce 
such “scientific” legal principles, students must make distinctions between relevant and 
irrelevant facts, while spotting substantive legal issues.60 Langdell’s case-dialogue method 
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approach encourages students to adopt the type of critical thinking typically associated with 
thinking like a lawyer. 
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching explained the impact the 
case-dialogue method had on students in a 2006 report on the status of American legal 
education.61 The report argued that the extrapolation of legal principles from the narrow sets of 
facts provided in casebook opinions discouraged moral inquiry into the law.62 As described in 
the report, the case-dialogue method's categorization of complex human interactions and 
conflicts into neat factual boxes discourages the “thinking through [of] the social consequences 
or ethical aspects of the conclusions.”63 The Carnegie Report concluded that this model of legal 
education warns students “not to let their moral concerns or compassion for the people in the 
cases they discuss cloud their legal analysis.”64 
If Langdell’s fundamental presumption was correct, mainly that law is a type of natural 
science, then the case-dialogue method’s failure to initiate moral inquiry is of little concern. 
Surely, if the law consists of unequivocally valid principles that produce good law, one need 
only discover those principles and apply them to new situations. If this were the case, moral 
inquiry, indeed, would serve only to cloud the analysis of scientific legal principles. 
Langdell’s fundamental presumption, however, is not correct. In his discussion of 
Langdell’s pedagogy, Edward Rubin asserts: “the idea that law is a type of natural science is 
obsolete in its entirety.”65 Rubin recognizes the current belief that the social sciences “provide 
the most useful analogies for the academic study of law in the sense, that they, like law, are 
“human sciences.”66 Rubin explains how most scholars’ conception of the law is sociological.67 
The law, in this regard, is seen as a construction of society’s cultural values.68 Rubin laments the 
failure of legal curriculum to recognize such a change: 
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[S]tudents of politics learned a great many lessons in the forty years after 1870, 
among them the idea that the real world, and not a library, is the true laboratory of 
the human sciences. Legal academics needed another seventy years or so to learn 
this, and they have not yet applied those lessons to the law school curriculum.69 
Modern scholarship has displaced Langdell’s premise of the law’s scientific objectivity. 
Yet, the case-dialogue method is still the primary pedagogical tool in the modern law school 
curriculum.70 As we shall see, the repercussions of stubbornly adhering to a faulty analytical 
framework go beyond the discouragement of moral inquiry within legal analysis. However, 
before we discuss the pedagogy’s influence on issues of race and the law, we must first 
acknowledge the existence of whiteness as a racial category. This is done next.   
IV. THE POWER AND PRIVILEGES OF WHITENESS 
“Whites spend a lot of time trying to persuade ourselves and each other that racism has 
nothing to do with us. A big step would be for whites to admit that we do benefit from 
racism and then to consider what to do about it.”71 
- Stephanie Wildman 
 
 When I first heard the term critical race theory, an image of a black man came into my 
head. In contrast, when someone provides a description of an individual, and that individual’s 
race is not specified, I readily assume that the person described is white.72 Moreover, as a white 
person, I can curse, spit and eat with my mouth open without having others attribute my behavior 
with the poor morality or civility of my race.73 Simply put, whiteness operates as the racial 
norm.74 As the normative standard for race, whiteness often goes unperceived.75 Barbara Flagg 
describes whites’ unconsciousness of whiteness as the transparency phenomenon.76 In her 
description of the transparency phenomenon, Flagg notes: 
White people externalize race. For most whites, most of the time, to think or 
speak about race is to think or speak about people of color, or perhaps, at times, to 
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reflect on oneself (or other whites) in relation to people of color. But we tend not 
to think of ourselves or our racial cohort as racially distinctive. Whites’ 
“consciousness” of whiteness is predominantly unconsciousness of whiteness.77  
 Having the option to ignore race is a privilege of whiteness. The dynamics of 
white privilege, however, extend beyond not having to think about race. In her article, 
White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, Peggy McIntosh provides a 
conceptual framework for understanding white privilege. McIntosh describes white 
privilege as an invisible knapsack of unearned assets.78 These assets, such as passports, 
clothes, guides, and blank checks are especially difficult for whites to notice.79  
 Whites can rely on cashing in the assets of their whiteness throughout many of 
their lived experiences.80 The assets are extensive and can be used in a variety of 
situations. McIntosh provides a number of examples: whites need not worry that their 
children will be provided a curriculum that testifies to the existence of their race;81 whites 
can be relatively confident that if they need to talk to “the person in charge” that person 
will be white;82 whites are never asked to be the “spokeswoman” for their racial group.83  
 The conceptualization of white privilege as an invisible knapsack is valuable 
because it helps to deconstruct the transparency of whiteness and white privilege. As 
McIntosh describes:  
Describing white privilege makes one newly accountable. As we in Women’s 
Studies work to reveal male privilege and ask men to give up some of their power, 
so one who writes about having white privilege must ask, “Having described it, 
what will I do to lessen or end it?”84 
 The benefits of white privilege go beyond the private, everyday effects discussed 
by McIntosh. Cheryl Harris testifies to the systemic nature of white privilege in her 
article, Whiteness as Property. As the title suggests, Harris argues that whiteness operates 
as a form of property.85 Harris uses the histories of African slavery and Native American 
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land conquest to trace the “evolution of whiteness from color to race to status to 
property.”86 Harris’ historical analysis leads her to conclude: “The law’s construction of 
whiteness defined and affirmed critical aspects of identity (who is white); of privilege 
(what benefits accrue to that status); and, of property (what legal entitlements arise from 
that status).”87 Harris concludes that the legal entitlements of whiteness continue to be 
protected today.88  
 The work of McIntosh and Harris make visible the ways an unconsciousness of 
whiteness perpetuates hidden systems of oppression. Whites interested in racial justice 
must acknowledge their own whiteness and its corresponding privileges.89 Whites, 
however, have a tendency to equate race consciousness with prejudice.90 Many whites, 
fearful of appearing prejudiced, claim to be “colorblind” when it comes to race.91 A 
colorblind approach implies that racism is nonexistent or has been defeated.92 McIntosh 
and Harris debunk the notion that we live in a post-racial environment. Their message 
reveals the importance of exploring racial privilege through active race consciousness.93 
 As a white man that grew up in a white family, I know that race consciousness is 
difficult for most whites. Race consciousness forces whites to confront their own 
relationship with systems of oppression. Uncovering one’s connection to racial 
subordination is uncomfortable. Indeed, the label of “racist” is vilifying. This is so 
because whites are taught to associate racism with individualistic discriminatory 
treatment.94 Yet the singular association of racism with discrimination obscures its 
corollary: privilege.95 With racial privilege unacknowledged, terms like racism become 
pigeonholed in their meaning. The racist is associated with the Ku Klux Klan member 
and the skinhead. The white not engaged in overt racial bigotry is classified as neutral or 
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nonracist, despite enjoying the daily benefits of white privilege. It is difficult for whites, 
comfortably entrenched in their neutrality, to confront the ways in which their identity 
contributes to racial subordination.  
 The remainder of this paper is an attempt to escape that comfort zone. The next 
section juxtaposes the case-dialogue method’s false presumption of legal objectivity with 
the call for racial consciousness.  
 
V. THE CASE-DIALOGUE METHOD’S PERPETUATION OF WHITE PRIVILEGE 
“To assume the air of perspectivelessness that is expected in the classroom, 
minority students must participate in the discussion as though they were not 
African-American or Latino, but colorless legal analysts.”96 
- Kimberle Crenshaw 
An understanding of white privilege sheds a particularly unfavorable light on Langdell’s 
case-dialogue method. The false presumption of the case-dialogue method, objectivity, stems 
from Langdell’s incorrect understanding of the law as a natural science.97 Langdell made this 
assumption at a time when nearly all lawmakers, legal educators, and law students were white. 
Thus, far from interrogating whiteness, the case-dialogue method affirms the transparency 
phenomenon by assigning whiteness as the objective value. Langdell’s legacy lives on, as most 
contemporary legal educators disregard the discussion of race in the classroom.98 Law students, 
in turn, are taught to adopt a colorblind approach to the law.99  
This academic environment places minority law students in compromising positions. 
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, a law professor and critical race theorist, examined the minority 
law student experience in her article, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal 
Education.100 Crenshaw began with the assumption that minority law students often have 
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different values, beliefs, and experiences than their classmates and professors.101 Crenshaw 
found that these differences are rarely discussed in a law school classroom because of the 
dominant assumption that legal analysis should be objective.102 As described by Crenshaw, the 
objectivity of legal analysis is presumed to posit “an analytical stance that has no specific 
cultural, political, or class characteristics.”103 Crenshaw coins this mode of analysis 
“perspectivelessness.”104 
 Crenshaw explains how the analysis of legal issues through the mode of 
perspectivelessness effects minority law students.105 Crenshaw begins with a discussion of 
perspectivelessness itself: 
While it seems relatively straightforward that objects, issues, and other 
phenomena are interpreted from the vantage point of the observer, many law 
classes are conducted as though it is possible to create, weigh, and evaluate rules 
and arguments in ways that neither reflect nor privilege any particular perspective 
or world view. Thus, law school discourse proceeds with the expectation that 
students will learn to perform the standard mode of legal reasoning and embrace 
its presumption of perspectivelessness.106 
Crenshaw argues that this dichotomy places minority students in a compromising 
position.107 Operating within the case-dialogue method leaves minority law students with one of 
two options.108 They may choose to deny their identity and analyze issues “objectively” within 
the Langdellian framework.109 Or they may accept and assert their identity and risk being 
ostracized for failing to think like a lawyer.110 Thus, if a minority student wants to participate in 
the “objective” discussion of a court’s reasoning she must leave her racial identity at the door 
and put on the hat of a supposedly colorless legal analyst. Crenshaw describes the consequences 
of such an analysis: 
The consequence of adopting this colorless mode is that when the discussion 
involves racial minorities, minority students are expected to stand apart from their 
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history, their identity, and sometimes their own immediate circumstances and 
discuss issues without making reference to the reality that the “they” or “them” 
being discussed is from their perspective “we” or “us.”111 
 The result is a classroom environment that actively encourages the silencing of minority 
students.112 Forced to stand apart from their own self, minorities are generally more reluctant 
than their white counterparts to speak in the classroom.113  
The silencing of minority law students supports both the private, everyday forms of white 
privilege discussed by Peggy McIntosh and the public, more systemic forms of white privilege 
discussed by Cheryl Harris. In reference to the everyday privilege discussed by McIntosh, the 
white law student can complete the assigned reading and answer a professor’s questions in class, 
assured that the legal reasoning asked of them will affirm their racial identity and history. This 
privilege is as much an asset as the property hornbook sitting inside the white student’s 
backpack.114 The white student, while sitting in class, unhindered by thoughts of identity, 
remains oblivious to the systemic forms of racial subordination embedded within the law.  
In reference to the systemic forms of white privilege discussed by Harris, discussions of 
whiteness as property never occur, as the voices that have the power to reveal the law’s 
endorsement of racial subordination are silenced. In the cruelest of ironies, the minority law 
student works within a legal educational system that produces “students who are dedicated to the 
maintenance of the status quo, even though that status quo is oppressive to them.”115  
The premise of objectivity, the bedrock of the case-dialogue pedagogy, creates a 
classroom environment steeped in an unconsciousness of whiteness. The pedagogy subordinates 
minority law students and preserves white privilege. Possibilities for change are discussed next. 
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VI. A DIFFERENT WAY TO LEARN THE LAW  
“Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the 
integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and 
bring about conformity to it, or it becomes “the practice of freedom,” the means 
by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover 
how to participate in the transformation of their world.” 116 
- Richard Shaull 
 
Derrick Bell, a prominent critical race theorist, has suggested that white self-interest is 
the primary motivation of racial progress.117 As a white law student, I take Bell’s suggestion as a 
challenge. I believe Bell is challenging all of those with racial privilege to work towards 
developing racial equality in ways that are not motivated by self-interest. 
The prevalence of Langdell’s case-dialogue method pedagogy represents the failure of 
law schools, as predominately white institutions, to accept Bell’s challenge. If law schools took 
white privilege seriously, they would not adopt a pedagogical approach that supports the faulty 
notion of perspectiveless legal analysis. If law schools took white privilege seriously, they would 
not create a classroom environment that places students in compromising positions due to their 
minority status. If law schools took white privilege seriously, they would not disguise the 
systemic forms of subordination embedded within the law.  
I am not the first to argue that traditional legal pedagogy fails to interrogate the 
relationship between race, whiteness and the law.118 In a recent work, Margalynne Armstrong 
and Stephanie Wildman argue for the adoption of “color insight” within the law school 
curriculum.119 Armstrong and Wildman stress the importance of talking about race, particularly 
whiteness, in the law school classroom.120 Armstrong and Wildman argue that the need to 
discuss race, and whiteness, arises from the fact that traditional legal pedagogy “tends to 
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‘whitewash’ law, ignoring the roles of whiteness and privilege in the construction of legal rules, 
institutions and the application of law.”121 After describing the need to talk about race, their 
conclusion provides a number of suggestions for the improvement of racial dialogue, both 
institutionally and in the classroom.122 Institutionally, an expansion of forums that discuss issues 
of racial justice is suggested.123 Possible forums include social justice centers, film series, and 
reading groups facilitated by faculty.124 In the classroom, assigned reading and discussion of 
different theoretical perspectives, ranging from critical race theory to law and economics, is 
suggested.125 
Armstrong and Wildman’s suggestions are unquestionably valuable. Their approach is 
pragmatic. Assigning a broader reading list can immediately be added to a professor’s syllabus. 
All law schools could open their auditorium or largest classroom a couple times a month for a 
film series focused on issues of race. These practical suggestions would help both students and 
faculty understand the role of race, particularly whiteness, in the law and the law school setting. 
An understanding of Langdell’s faulty analytical framework bolsters Armstrong and 
Wildman’s argument for color insight in the law school classroom. In my view, however, legal 
educators should go beyond Armstrong and Wildman’s suggestions for “setting a context for 
talking about race and whiteness”126 and adopt a pedagogy that fully interrogates the case-
dialogue method’s false assumption of objectivity.  
I am not suggesting that every first-year Property case should be deconstructed by neo-
Marxist thought.127 However, similarly to Armstrong and Wildman, I do feel that the formal 
incorporation of theory within the legal curriculum would help students deconstruct legal 
reasoning’s supposed objectivity.128  Many legal scholars, especially those enamored with the 
traditional American liberal legal system, are critical of the incorporation of theory within legal 
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studies, arguing that the incorporation of theory abandons the objectivity and importance of 
law.129 Yet the pedagogy I propose would not seek to abandon the law.130 As described by 
Duncan Kennedy, I envision a pedagogy that allows students “to think about the law in a way 
that will allow one to enter into it, to criticize without utterly rejecting it, and to manipulate it 
without self-abandonment to their system of thinking and doing.”131 It is there, working within a 
knowingly flawed legal system, where students could constructively and productively challenge 
the legitimacy of the legal rules and reasoning they are taught to adopt.  
A model approach would be similar to John Calmore’s understanding of legal education 
“as the practice of freedom.”132 Calmore argues that “traditional approaches to teaching that 
simply reinforce domination” must be abandoned.133 Calmore’s pedagogy directly challenges the 
decontextualized reading of cases endorsed by the case-dialogue method. The core tenets of his 
pedagogy are succinctly outlined in the Preface of the text he uses in his Antidiscrimination Law 
course: 
Our primary goal is to enable students to read law critically with a special 
sensitivity to the ways in which legal techniques, rhetorical strategies, and 
legal practices reproduce patterns of power and privilege that work to 
subordinate people based on categories of identity. The materials are 
designed to reveal these strategies through close readings of the language 
and underlying assumptions in judicial opinions. Students are encouraged 
to examine legal opinions for their similarities and differences in 
approaches to power and privilege across identity categories and to 
compare them with insights garnered from the wide range of multi-
disciplinary scholarly excerpts surrounding the case texts.134 
A pedagogy based on Calmore’s approach would adopt Armstrong and Wildman’s notion 
of color insight, while also interrogating Langdell’s incorrect assumption of legal objectivity. It 
would be a critical study of the law. It would challenge white privilege. It would be a more 
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honest, challenging and intellectual approach than the current model. It would be a better legal 
education.  
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